Abstract. Between 1999 and, since no single party was in a position to lead a majority in the Lok Sabha, preelectoral coalitions have become the only option for parties to exercise executive power at the Centre. Looking at the trajectory of two pre-electoral coalitions over ten years, namely the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance and the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance, the paper attempts to contribute to the nascent research on pre-electoral coalitions. Much has been written on the importance of disproportionate electoral systems or the ideological distance between parties in the formation of governing coalitions. This paper explores the importance of different geographical bases of support in the composition and sustainability of Indian pre-electoral coalitions, election after election, and proposes preliminary elements for a dynamic theory of pre-electoral coalition formation.
Introduction
[1] The 15th Lok Sabha elections offer an opportunity to analyze the changes of the Indian party system, and particularly the politics of coalition in the multi-level setting which characterizes it today. Coalitions are not a new phenomenon in India as coalition formation took place in some states as early as the late 1960s and at the national level for the first time in 1977-1980 1 . But until the late 1990s coalitions were mainly anti-Congress in nature and characterized by strong political and governmental instability. During the last decade however, since no single party is in a position to lead a majority in the Lok Sabha, coalitions have become the only option for parties to exercise executive power. In such a political context, as Golder explains, [parties] can compete independently at election time and hope to be part of any government coalition that subsequently forms. Or they can form a pre-electoral coalition with another party (or parties) prior to the election in the hopes of governing together afterwards (2006: 193) .
[2] Studying the recent Indian experience of coalitions might address two lacunae in the vast literature in political science on coalitions. First, although there are many studies on coalition government, there has been little theoretical and empirical research addressing pre-electoral coalitions (Golder 2006) and interaction between electoral behaviour and the politics of coalition (Laver 1989; Narud 1996) . Second, in data sets on parliamentary democracies, the Indian case is often not included as case studies usually focus on western industrialized democracies. Yet India offers a clear case for the disproportionality hypothesis characterized by huge electoral advantage because of its 'first past the post' electoral system, which 'provides an electoral bonus to large parties or coalitions through their mechanical effect on the translation of votes into seats' (Golder 2006: 198) . In addition to the electoral system, the ever-increasing number of parties that take part in the General Elections is also favourable to the formation of large coalitions. The decline over the years of the once dominant Congress party has left a vacuum that state(s)-based parties are ready to occupy and has led to the formation of pre-electoral coalitions to govern the country.
[3] The first objective of this paper is to start addressing the research gap on pre-electoral coalitions in India. The second objective is to propose preliminary elements for a dynamic theory (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) ', South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, Special IssueNb. 3 of pre-electoral coalition formation, as theories on this topic have been so far essentially static, or dealing with the dynamics of a single coalition formation situation (Grofman 1982) . Such an objective makes it necessary (a) to historicize the coalition phenomenon by giving an account of changes in the party system over an extended period of time (three elections over ten years), and (b) to represent the spatial dimension of the coalitions under study.
[4] We will consider pre-electoral alliances as non-formal coalitions, i.e. as coalitions '[reflecting] informal patterns of cooperation among parties [that] tend to devise electoral seat adjustments in constituencies that maximize their probability of electoral success' (Kugler & Swaminathan 1999: 177) . Here seat adjustments are defined as 'mutual agreements between parties not to compete against each other in individual constituencies but to share seat contests on an agreed basis' (Fickett 1993) . We chose to take vote maximization as the main criteria for the formation of pre-electoral coalition (Golder 2006: 195) , even if all states are not characterized by a multiparty/bipolar system 2 . Indeed we consider vote maximization as the major determinant of politicians' actions as it drives parliamentary influence and access to positions of power: 'the benefit of votes is their contribution to office and policy benefits' (Narud 1996: 501) .
[5] With the purpose of giving a comprehensive understanding of the evolution of the relations between national or nationwide parties (NWP) and state(s)-based or non nationwide parties (NNWP) 3 in the context of coalition formation over the last decade, this paper aims at analyzing the trajectories of the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) within their own coalitions, respectively the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) composed of parties that normally compete in the same constituencies, and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), composed of parties with more differentiated geographical bases of support.
[6] The paper will argue that pre-electoral coalition formation can be the expression of different strategies (depending on the leading party involved), which bring about varying electoral and political results in the long run. In order to support this argument, we articulate this paper around two core questions: One, in the long run and from the point of view of the two main national parties, is alliance-building a successful strategy to gain or to keep enough (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) From contextualization to theory: changes in the party system and preelectoral coalitions [7] Before proceeding, it useful to define two fundamental notions: the notion of 'preelectoral coalition' and that of 'party system'. Concerning pre-electoral coalitions, we use the definition given by Golder (2006: 195) : 'a pre-electoral coalition exists when multiple parties choose to co-ordinate their electoral strategies rather than run for office alone'. Regarding the party system, which usually denotes the way in which various parties interact at a particular level of political competition and/or cooperation (e.g., predominant party system, multiple party system, etc), one must note that 'there are [actually] several party systems operating in different arenas and linked to each other in a range of different ways, so that change in one system induces or reflects change in another' (Laver 1989: 303) . For the purpose of this study and given the data sets we are using, we focus on the interactions between two dimensions of the party system: the electoral dimension (i.e. the proportion of votes cast for a party) and the legislative dimension (i.e. the proportion of seats won by a party). Given the nature of the Indian party system, i.e. the number of parties spread all over the country with a narrow electoral basis at the national level, coalitions in India are mainly defined by their utilitarian role for actors coming from different ideological backgrounds. As Chakrabarty argues, 'what seems crucial in this process [of coalition formation] is not 'ideological purity' but 'the exigency of the situation' where the former seems to be a liability rather than an asset' (Chakrabarty 2006: 1) .
[8] In one of her seminal works, Irina Stefuriuc (2009: 93) argues that 'coalition formation is one of the main challenges that political parties face in decentralized political systems'. But do all political parties face the same level of challenge? Changes in the party system and the alliance strategies developed by national parties suggest that coalition formation is more challenging for national parties than for state(s)-based parties. Indeed, in the present party system, those states where national parties (Congress and BJP) fight elections head on represent only one-sixth of the total Lok Sabha seats (Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Delhi) (Chawla 2009 ). The Congress party plays the role of junior coalition partner in most of the other states since the early 1990s. (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) [9] During the last three General Elections, coalitions have characterized a party system that has evolved from a one dominant party system (in which free competition among parties occurred, but where the INC enjoyed a dominant position) 4 'to a multi-party system characterized by a more differentiated structure of party competition' (Kothari 1970) . In the latter system, state(s)-based parties have emerged as a serious electoral alternative to the dominant party in their own state and aspire to play a role at the national level. This has led to the formation of electoral coalitions at the national level: since no single party was able to get an absolute majority in the Lok Sabha, parties whose political and electoral influence was hitherto confined to state(s) politics have found a space in the Central government (Palshikar 2003: 328) . At the state level however, national or regional parties are still able to get an absolute majority in the legislative assembly, the Vidhan Sabha. (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) [10] Whereas the electoral system has remained unchanged, the party system has evolved drastically over the last fourteen years. The collection of maps (Map 1) [11] From 1998/1999 onwards, coalitions at the federal level have emerged from three types of party configurations at the state level: 1) bi-partism characterized by the opposition between the INC and the BJP; 2) bi-partism characterized by the opposition between two state parties; 3) bi-polarization structured around two coalitions. Changes in the national party system and the formation of coalitions at this level directly result from the increasing complexity of state party systems. Indeed, as mentioned by Suhas Palshikar, 'the theatre for defining the boundaries of political contestation often turned out to be the state. Whether a party will be only antiCongress or also anti-BJP depended upon the state-level configuration of forces rather than on national-level exigencies or ideological positions ' (2003: 330) . In a multi-cultural society like India, the process of coalition building takes place both at the national and state level (Mehra et al. 2003 ) with each level having its own distinct compulsion, with each state breeding its own particular type of party system. As a result, the linkages between the national multiparty system described by Balveer Arora as 'bi-nodal, a node being typically a centering point of component parts ' (2003: 84) , and states' multiparty systems have changed 'towards a more complex mechanism of negotiation, alliance and coalition building' (Hansen & Jaffrelot 1998: 7) . The balance of political power between the Centre and the states has evolved towards an increased (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) mutual political and electoral dependence between components of the party system at these two different levels (Chatterjee 1997: 306) .
Map 1. General Elections results (1984 -1999)
[12] In terms of seats in the Lok Sabha, coalitions do not represent a force equivalent to that of the Congress Party before the 1990s. This is due to a process of extreme fragmentation of the states' political scene -very few parties have a large geographical base, spreading over several States, which means that most coalitions are formed of parties with different geographical bases in terms of party, representatives, and voters -with a direct consequence on the national level. The multiplication of state-based parties makes electoral results at the national level much more uncertain, and the formation and resilience of election coalitions much more difficult.
Indeed, in a party system with a large number of parties the process of coalition formation is far more complex than in a three party system (Laver 1989: 308) . This complexity implies the definition of 'alternative norms' for the building of a coalition like 'bargaining over payoffs [proceeding] only after bargaining over membership is over and the composition of the coalition has been settled' (Schofield & Laver 1985: 161) 
Data and methodology
[13] Golder identifies three criteria that make a pre-electoral coalition valid (2006: 195) :
-Joint candidate, joint list; -Prior to election, different parties claim that they will govern together; -Coordination of the campaign (i.e. common platform).
[14] Also, parties have to make the coalition public. Golder argues that voter behaviour might be affected by one or all of these criteria. A pre-electoral coalition will then attract a larger number of voters than if the same parties were to compete independently. While each criterion makes perfect sense from a theoretical point of view, the reality of Indian politics in general and Lok Sabha elections in particular make it difficult to track the parties involved in pre-electoral (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) coalitions 5 . While an agreement may be found between parties either to govern together or to build a joint-list at the national level, such decisions cannot always be enforced at the state-level.
The state units of national parties like the BJP or the Congress often fight against these national agreements when they involve a party that is their competitor at the local level. Thus during the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, the Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)) unit in Karnataka was vehemently against a joint-list with the BJP and filed its own candidates in the parliamentary constituencies.
[15] But the contrary is also true. Some state level agreement can be observed between parties that do not follow national trends. coalition will give us a better understanding of the spatial trend of each coalition. (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance: a landmark in Indian politics [21] With the development of region-based, competitive party systems, the 'ideological vacuum resulting from the rapid decline of the Congress system and the gradual abandonment of the Nehruvian national consensus on both socialism and secularism in the second half of the 1980s' (Pai 2002: 64) , the BJP managed to create its own political space both at the national and state level. But due to its geographical deficits (Arora 2003: 93) resulting from social and ideological factors, the BJP did not achieve a Congress-type dominance and did not succeed in emerging as a single national alternative since the Congress party remained a potent force in most states. However the BJP has been able to grasp the reality of federalization of India's party system (Arora 2003: 83) better than the Congress and it adopted the coalition principle as the party's policy in the Chennai declaration of December 28, 1999 7 . The states-based alliances forged by the BJP 'provided it with crucial seats from its allies in regions where it had no base' (Pai 1998: 838) .
[22] The formation of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance therefore represents a landmark as the party system moved decisively towards stable coalitions composed of national and state(s)-based parties. The NDA represents a new phenomenon 'in the sense that it has strengthened the federal character of national polity' (Chakrabarty 2006: 171) .
Previous coalitions (in 1977 and 1989) represented the opposition between the Congress and all the other parties and did not have the federal character of the NDA (and later UPA).
[23] The BJP paid a heavy price to unbalanced and fragile government coalitions in 1998 and 1999, as it lost the vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha by a margin of one vote (with the AIADMK stepping out of the coalition). The BJP leadership then envisioned a strong and large pre-electoral coalition for the General Elections held at the end of 1999. The BJP was then the largest party on the national stage but it needed allies to remain in power. In the long term, the BJP was also interested in building partnerships with state-level parties in order to expand its base. The success of this strategy in Maharashtra or in Karnataka reinforced this position.
[24] In 1999, vote for the BJP was clustered along a line going from Gujarat through Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand (Map 2). While voters from these states represented 17 % of total Indian voters, BJP voters from these states represented 36 % of (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) total Indian BJP voters. The party scored on average 53 % of votes in Gujarat constituencies and 49 % in Rajasthan constituencies. It came with a good performance in northern Himalayan constituencies and in Goa-North Karnataka region. Thanks to the support of its allies, the BJP established pockets in Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal 8 , Maharashtra and Bihar. The BJP's allies also came with strong performances. In states like Orissa, Haryana, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, the NDA won the majority of the seats. In Tamil Nadu and in Andhra Pradesh, states where the BJP's presence is weak, its allies won 21 and 29 seats respectively. Comparing the geography of vote share between the BJP and its allies (Map 2), we can observe a complementary spatial distribution between the two. This is particularly true of states like Bihar or Maharashtra where pockets of low BJP vote share are in fact NDA allies' stronghold. In this election BJP was at its peak in terms of vote share, seats, as well as spatial distribution. In Tamil Nadu, the BJP's new ally, the AIADMK, lost the ten constituencies it had won in 1999. Wherever the BJP decided to go on its own, the party was 8 For the first time in its history the BJP won a seat in West Bengal. (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) Punjab, where the BJP allied with old partners, the party was successful in expanding its support base (i.e. +750 000 votes in Maharashtra from 21.18 % to 22.61 % of votes polled).
[26] The losses of the BJP in states where it contested, on its own, members of the opposite coalition and/or former NDA components proved the inevitable necessity of pre-electoral coalition formation for a national party in this highly competitive political system. [28] Left without allies in several states (Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Orissa, West Bengal), the party suffered a massive blow and simply failed to sustain its positions in these states. In Tamil Nadu, the number of BJP voters declined by 51 % between 2004 and 2009 (minus 700 000 voters, from 5.07 % to 2.34 % of votes polled). In Andhra Pradesh the BJP lost 1.4 million voters (from 8.41 % to 3.75 % of votes polled). In its central India stronghold the BJP suffered from the good performance of Congress in Rajasthan (47.19 % of votes polled for the latter). However in Bihar the NDA was victorious by a landslide thanks to the JD(U)'s good scores (24.04 % of votes polled). The BJP has established itself as the main party of Karnataka politics with a support base of more than 10 million voters now (41.63 % of votes polled). (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) We can explain such trends by the decreasing number of parties involved with the NDA: NDA spatial distribution over India is less and less homogeneous. (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) only to parties that offered substantial benefits' (Manor 1995: 106) .
[33] Despite this defeat, Congress dominance over the Indian political scene lasted for almost 40 years, partly thanks to a strategy that yielded votes from both the common people and ) 'Pre-electoral Coalitions, Party System and Electoral Geography: A Decade of General Elections in India (1999 the dominant castes and because factionalism made it possible to offset the internal rivalries within the party, at least until the 1960s (Kothari 1964) .
[34] 1999 marked a new low in Congress electoral history. By securing only 114 seats at the Lok Sabha, the party was no longer the first party of Indian politics. Many Congress insiders had believed that the party could still win an election on its own and without a strong pre-electoral coalition. Although 1999 saw some local agreements over joint-list in Tamil Nadu or in Kerala, no
proper pre-electoral coalition was put in place. The outcome for Congress in major states like Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Bihar and West Bengal was very poor. Hitting a low in terms of seats, the Congress was still a major contender in many parts of India with regard to vote share.
Comparing the geography of BJP and Congress vote share is very instructive in that regard.
Contrary to the BJP, the areas of high percentage of Congress vote share (above 40 % of votes polled) are scattered all over India (Map 5): Central India, southern states (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka), the North East, and northern India. By refusing to build a pre-electoral coalition, the Congress failed to translate its strong scores into seats. It was defeated either by the BJP or by other NDA parties that could benefit from cross support. Because of the geography of its support base, building a pre-electoral coalition was more difficult for the Congress than for the BJP. The BJP could find allies where its presence was weak, like in southern and eastern India, thus without threatening its allies' position, at least in the short term. The Congress had more at stake in the painful negotiations involved in building the pre-electoral coalitions.
[ [36] Thus the Congress party set out to build a pre-electoral coalition for the 2004
General Elections. In Andhra Pradesh and Jharkhand it succeeded in building joint-list with newly formed parties. In Andhra Pradesh, the newly formed Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) agreed on seat sharing in Telengana region. In Jharkhand, the Congress built an alliance with the Jharkhand Mukhti Morcha (JMM). In states like Bihar and Tamil Nadu, the Congress was no longer a threat to local parties. In Bihar, it joined at the last minute the Rashtriya Janata Dal ) 'Pre-electoral Coalitions, Party System and Electoral Geography: A Decade of General Elections in India (1999 
Conclusions
[42] Looking at the trajectory of two pre-electoral coalitions over ten years, the present paper tries to contribute to the nascent research on pre-electoral coalitions. While much has been written on the importance of disproportionate electoral systems or the ideological distance between parties in the formation of pre-electoral coalitions, this paper explores the importance of different geographical bases of support in the composition and sustainability of Indian preelectoral coalitions, election after election.
[43] The BJP saw the decline of its alliance partly because it had not much to offer to its allies besides accessing power in New Delhi. Prior to the 1999 general elections the party was particularly strong in central and northern India, and in a position to govern at the national level. It could be the vehicle for regional parties (mostly from southern and eastern India) to gain leverage in New Delhi. But because the BJP remained out of power at the national level and lost its grasp on its Central India stronghold in 2009, it had little to offer in terms of vote base. The party's success in many states was highly dependent on the position of its allies. Between 1999 and 2009 the BJP lost 1.7 million votes in Andhra Pradesh (from 9.9 % to 3.75 % of votes polled), 1.3 million in West Bengal (from 11.13 % to 6.14 % of votes polled) and 1.2 million in Tamil Nadu (from 7.14 % to 2.34 % of votes polled). [44] In contrast, the Congress benefited from its spatially scattered vote base. At the state and at the national levels, the Congress always had votes and constituencies over which to bargain with its allies. The party does not depend as much as the BJP on its coalition partners.
Between 2004 [45] The major discrepancy between the BJP and the Congress is their motivation for coalition formation. Whereas the Congress is managing somehow to maintain itself as a pan Indian organization, the BJP is still struggling to establish itself as a national party with a pan Indian distribution.
[46] In a multi-party federal system, while competing for vote maximization, parties have to decide which partners to accept in a coalition; this involves the risk of '[producing] confusion on
[their] specific ideological position and [their] relative distance from the other parties' (Colomer & Martinez 1995: 43) . However this study of Indian elections underlines the resilience of competition between parties belonging to the same pre-poll alliance. On the one hand, cooperation with one's coalition partners may not be in the best interest of coalition participants who hope to increase their future influence. On the other hand, extreme competitiveness is not in their long-term interest either, although it is the best strategy for coalition members interested in short-term gains. The ideal strategy for those who seek long-term increases in their influence is a mixture of competition and cooperation, as shown by Bueno de Mesquita (1975: 1) . Finally, the Indian case also reminds us that coalitions are more likely to win elections when their size (in number of parties) is large but characterized by a significant size difference between the coalition partners.
